We may note texts by Eva Lundgren-Gothlin, Nancy Bauer, and more recently Karen Green and Nicholas Roffey. 10 Almost all who so far have added to the exegetical debate share a common presupposition: Beauvoir's Hegelianism is that of the master-slave dialectic. 11 Such understandings of the centrality of the master-slave dialectic are not limited to Beauvoir scholarship. It is widely held that the most significant figure in the tradition of French Hegelianism is Alexandre Kojève whose lectures at the École Pratique des Hautes Etudes from 1933 to 1939, just before the first French translation of the Phenomenology, are believed to have initiated an entire generation into the reading of Hegel. 12 Kojève's Hegel is grounded in a specifically anthropological reading of the Phenomenology of Spirit and makes central the master-slave dialectic. (Jean Hyppolite plays a supporting role in this understanding.) The French Hegel has effectively become Kojève's Hegel and become that of the master-slave dialectic. And so for Lundgren-Gothlin: 'like Kojève and Hyppolite, Beauvoir was primarily interested in the Phenomenology of Spirit, and, like Kojève, mainly in the master-slave dialectic'. 13 Bauer follows this lead. 14 Yet significantly, the extent of scholarly interest in Beauvoir's Hegelianism stems from the fact that she neither simply nor mechanically applies the master-slave dialectic to the plight of man and woman: Lundgren-Gothlin argues convincingly that Beauvoir does not merely equate woman with the slave, and Bauer adds that 'the man [… cannot] be located within the terms of Hegel's dialectic any more easily than the woman can'. 15 There is today no doubt that Beauvoir is an original and independent thinker and her appropriation of other philosophers is always productive and often critical in ways not immediately apparent. 16 Yet the lack of consensus on Beauvoir's relationship to Hegel may well be an indication that a piece of the puzzle is missing; neither Lundgren-Gothlin, Bauer, nor Green and Roffey take the lack of fit between Hegel's master-slave dialectic and Beauvoir's analysis of the relationship between man and woman as an invitation to read Beauvoir's Hegelianism more broadly than in terms of a narrowly understood Kojèvian master-slave dialectic.
There are good reasons to suppose that the place of Kojève in French Hegelianism has been overemphasized and/or oversimplified. Bruce Baugh argues that 'the grandiose claim that Kojève effectively initiated an entire generation […] into the Hegelian mysteries […] cannot be maintained'. 17 Baugh's study focuses on the older and conceptually primary tradition of reading Hegel: older, as the tradition started with Jean Wahl's (1929) Le malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel; 18 more primary, as the unhappy consciousness is a 'phase of the development of the freedom of self-consciousness that follows the stages of master and slave, stoicism, and skepticism', and therefore subsumes the master-slave dialectic. 19 Significantly then Hegelianism that makes primary unhappy consciousness will include the master-slave dialectic but only as one aspect. 20 Beauvoir read the Phenomenology during the Nazi occupation of Paris. 21 But this was not her first exposure to Hegelianism; she read Wahl's book in 1929 and used it to help her read the Phenomenology. 22 Furthermore, Beauvoir wrote that neither she nor Sartre attended or were influenced by Kojève's lectures. 23 There are then reasons to think that Beauvoir's Hegel was not as influenced by Kojève as commentators have generally assumed.
For his part Stefanos Geroulanos argues that Kojève's influence has been oversimplified though not overemphasised. For this paper the pertinent point is that contemporary commentary relies primarily on Raymond Queneau's heavily edited version of Kojève's lectures while overlooking Kojève's extensive extant lecture notes and other published writings. 24 For Geroulanos, Kojève's reading of Hegel was in fact influential in three aspects, not one: of course his treatment of the master-slave dialectic, but also his thematisation of time, and his obsession with the end of history around Napoleon and/or Stalin. 25 This last point was Kojève's major contribution to the emergence of a French atheistic anti-humanism; once again the point is not that the master-slave dialectic is unimportant, but rather that French Hegelianism is not reducible to just this one aspect.
Pursuing these ideas I want to begin with two very simple observations: First, Hegel, and Kojève after him, are interested in the master-slave dialectic, so Beauvoir's tendency to use the term 'sovereign' as a synonym for 'master' is already a move away from them. And 'sovereignty' is not a major concept in Hegel (nor in Sartre). 26 However, from the 1930s onwards, the term is a major pillar of the thought of Georges Bataille. 27 Second, in Beauvoir's oeuvre the term 17 Baugh, French Hegel, 1. See also, Altman, 'Beauvoir, Hegel, War'. 18 Baugh, French Hegel, 1-7. 19 Baugh, French Hegel, 3. 20 Beauvoir explicitly uses the phrase 'unhappy consciousness': Beauvoir, Second Sex, 159. The main reference to the master-slave dialectic in the Ethics occurs within the specific context of a discussion of Hegel's ethics but only constitutes one of about sixteen references to Hegel (by proper name). S. de Press, 1985 Press, [1933 Press, -1934 ). This paper will not refer to Bataille's major work on the topic in the posthumously published La souveraineté because it was published too late to have influenced either The Ethics of Ambiguity or 'sovereign' has a place before the introduction of The Second Sex. As I will show, it is a significant term in the Ethics of Ambiguity and its usage there is not tied to the master-salve dialectic, but rather to Hegelianism more broadly, including to Bataille's Hegel.
It will be my argument that Beauvoir' s Hegelianism is at least as mediated by the tradition of French anti-humanism which leads from Hegel, through Kojève, into Bataille (the third aspect of Kojève's influence that Geroulanos identifies) as it is by Kojève's anthropological interpretation of Hegel centering on the master-slave dialectic (the first aspect of Kojève's influence). I will not argue that Hegel's master-salve dialectic is unimportant for Beauvoir; on the contrary she saw it as being of great importance, as did Bataille. 28 Rather I argue that understandings of Beauvoir's Hegelianism are incomplete if they do not include the Kojèvian theme of homogeneity and particularly Bataille's response in his theories of heterogeneity and sovereignty. 29 This paper will examine Beauvoir's use of and response to Bataille: it will only examine Bataille's or Beauvoir's substantive relationships to either Hegel or Kojève in order to serve this purpose. 30 The first section will focus on Bataille's ontology, his concept of sovereignty, and his presence in the Ethics. The second section will develop this reading in the context of The Second Sex, specifically showing that central to Beauvoir's understanding of sexual difference is the idea of the heterogeneous being of women vis-à-vis the unified being of men.
BATAILLE, SOVERIEIGNTY, AND THE ETHICS OF AMBIGUITY
The Ethics of Ambiguity (1948) is a significant though under-read text for the history of French theory. It underpins Beauvoir's more famous The Second Sex, particularly the famously brief gestures she makes there toward the possibility of authentic relationships in which woman can 'reconquer her dignity as transcendent and free subject while assuming her carnal condition'. 31 The Ethics is a complex text. The terms of its ontology of the subject are well known: the subject is ambiguous. As intentional consciousness the subject is comprised of two moments, one that discloses being, the other that identifies the disclosing 'I' with the being it discloses; the first is a moment of revelation, the second of appropriation; the mood of the first is joyful and wondrous, the mood of the second is anxious and assertive. The two modes contest each other but are bound to each other. The first moment echoes Husserl and, though the text does not mention him by name, Merleau-Ponty; the second Hegel and Sartre. Ultimately for Beauvoir, the desire to disclose being succeeds; the desire to be fails. Though the Ethics finds no equilibrium it does privilege the first moment, locating ethics in affirmation of the joy of freedom, and of the other and their freedom. 32 The text can be read in terms which are more or less Sartrean but it is open to other voices. A key marker of this openness is Beauvoir's use of the term 'sovereign'. She uses it twice in the first three pages without precisely indicating how she understands it; 'sovereign being', here juxtaposed with the being of objects, is equated with consciousness. 33 One page later she equates sovereignty with freedom over servitude, significance over insignificance, and ends over means. 34 It is tempting to read this as a reference to Hegel's master, and there are certainly strong grounds for this. 35 But importantly Beauvoir herself does not actually do so. Rather, in France from the 1930s onwards, the term 'sovereign' is a major pillar of Bataille's thought, and I do not think Beauvoir's use of the term is incidental. 36 The Ethics mentions Bataille by name twice, once specifically naming his 1943 Inner Experience. 37 Bataille is a difficult figure to locate in the broader movements of twentieth-century theory. This is partly due to the changing mood of his oeuvre even if the change in content is not great. Bataille had an intimate and antagonistic relationship with the surrealists and it is tempting to read him in these terms. However many of his writings are best considered in terms of a mystical tradition which leads to him from Pascal, through Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. (The tradition of existentialist responses to Hegel, specifically in Kierkegaard, is one with which Beauvoir associates herself. 38 ) These writings tend to be highly stylized: autobiographical, gnomic, aphoristic; they are often esoteric and presume the reader is an initiate. This work is best understood as a version of existential (a-)theology. By contrast others of his works are sociological in the tradition of Durkheim. 39 (A tradition too within which Beauvoir is working.) Less recondite, they are more transparently theoretical. In works such as Literature and Evil his writing is most easily understood as literary critique. And then there is his literary pornography. Bataille's influence on post-structuralism has been much written about (and perhaps overstated); he has been described as a 'rope linking 1930s radicalism to that of the 1960s'. 40 There are at least two ways to understand the relationship between Beauvoir and Bataille. First, given that they knew each other, moved in the same social and intellectual circles, and had read each other's work, we may understand their relationship as one governed by specific interactions. Bataille was slightly older than Beauvoir but not by much. 41 Both were active figures in the E. Lundgren-Gothlin, 'Simone de Beauvoir's Notions of Appeal, Desire, and Ambiguity and their Relationship to Jean-Paul Sartre's Notions of Appeal and Desire', Hypatia, 14:4 (1999): 83-95 (84) . 33 Beauvoir, Ethics of Ambiguity, 7. 34 Beauvoir, Ethics of Ambiguity, 8-9. 35 On the extent to which Hegel's 'master' and Bataille's 'sovereign' are equivalent terms see, Gemerchak, The Sunday of the Negative, 44-9. While Gemerchack does initially presume a basic equivalence he also notes that the terms are not exact and notes various ways in which Bataille's term usurps or inverts Hegel's. 36 Especially, but not exclusively, in G. Bataille, 'The Psychological Structure of Fascism'. See also, Bataille, 'Sovereignty'. For her part Zeynep Direk traces the relationship between Bataille and Beauvoir in terms of immanence not, as I am doing here, in terms of sovereignty. She argues that 'Bataille is the fundamental thinker of Hegelian immanence on the French scene' (Direk, 'Immanence and Abjection', 54, see also 71). She defines immanence as 'the flow between the living body and its environing outside' (Direk, 'Immanence and Abjection', 65). It is worth nothing the proximity between her reading of immanence and the reading of heterogeneous being which I will develop in this paper; the concepts are highly proximate without being identical. 37 Beauvoir, Ethics of Ambiguity, 70 and 126. 38 Bataille (1897 Bataille ( -1962 ; Beauvoir (1908 Beauvoir ( -1986 ).
French intellectual left and
Sartre was an open, if ungenerous, critic of Bataille. 42 That they were knowledgeable about each other's writings is testified to by overt references in their work. Second, and more generally, they were products of a very similar intellectual milieu and so shared common influences. Two are worth mentioning; first, French anthropology and sociology including such figures as Durkheim, Mauss, and Levi-Strauss. 43 More on this influence ought to be written; however, this paper will limit itself to the second common influence, French Hegelianism and the emerging tradition of French atheist anti-humanism. 44 Kojève looms large here. 45 But rather than tracing in detail these specific interactions or common influences this paper will focus on the thematic continuities, including the specific disagreements, which exist between the two oeuvres and will argue that given the close historical proximity between them these thematic continuities cannot be accidental. This paper will focus on Bataille's ontology and on its relationship to Beauvoir's existential phenomenology. Care needs to be taken in reading Bataille in terms of phenomenology. 46 While he does consider that phenomenology is 'the only philosophy which lives', he distances himself from it on the grounds that phenomenology places too heavy an emphasis on the epistemological value of experience, 'not understand[ing] that the limit as the goal of knowledge, needs to be crossed'. 47 Accordingly, Bataille specifically distances himself from Hegelian phenomenology because it 'represents the mind as essentially homogeneous'. 48 I will here consider Bataille's relationship with existential phenomenology; I will not consider him as a phenomenologist. Bataille certainly is not a transcendental phenomenologist in the sense of Husserl: while he does privilege experience in an existential sense, Bataille does not privilege consciousness, or have in his thought an equivalent of the transcendental ego. There is less concern in reading Bataille as an ontologist. There is a fundamental ontology underpinning his project and there are moments in his writing where this is made explicit. 49 I want to make this clear: Bataille does have an ontology of the subject, and this paper will take some care to reconstruct it and show Beauvoir's use of it. He does not, however, privilege the singular conscious subject within his ontology; rather his preoccupation is with an ontology of complex beings.
It is possible, Bataille wrote, 'to consider the conglomerationtown, city, or villageas the fundamental element of human society'. 50 (127). Hollier's collection may be taken to imply that the chapter was written by Roger Caillois who was scheduled to present on 19 February 1938. However, as the editorial notes makes clear, due to illness Bataille spoke in his place and is in fact the author of the chapter. significantly has the same ontological status as an individual human being, or as 'inert corpuscles', beehives, or cosmic entities such as stars. 51 Consciousness, which is for Bataille always divisible, also has complex being and can equally be a property of societies as of the individual. 52 It was the study of society in these terms, and the means by which societies were brought together, which was the focus of the Collège de Sociologie (1937) (1938) (1939) , a research group formed by Bataille in consultation with Roger Caillois and Michel Leiris. 53 (Kojève was associated with the group but he was not a member and was somewhat distant from its core interests. Jean Wahl was also involved. 54 ) For the Collège, what holds societies together is the sacredthat is to say the tabooobject at the centre: the 'social nucleus'. 55 The social nucleus is, in fact, taboo, that is to say, untouchable and unspeakable […] . Everything leads us to believe that early human beings were brought together by disgust and by common terror, by an insurmountable horror focused precisely on what originally was the central attraction of their union. 56 Nothing is more important for us than that we recognise that we are bound and sworn to that which horrifies us most, that which provokes our most intense disgust. 57 Perhaps the key feature of taboo for Bataille, and this is significant for his theory of sovereignty, is that [It] consists essentially in the expulsion of certain objects into a region that is impossible to penetrate. These objects have, if you will, the power to send away, or at least keep at a distance, all the individuals who participate in the institution. That is, in essence, not a case of objects consecrated by beliefs or fixed ritualsit is corpses, blood, especially menstrual blood, menstruating women themselves.
[…] These objects, […] are impure and untouchable, and they are sacred. 58 This quote, and particularly its positioning of women as taboo, introduces themes which will be central to The Second Sex and to the second part of this paper. Significantly for Bataille the feudal lord or kingthe sovereign in a political senseis taboo. So too is the divine. 59 It is their exclusion from the group or society which allows them to be the guarantor of the order of things. 60 Sovereign power amalgamates the disparate elements through the imposition of unity; 61 it unifies through exclusion, an act that creates the homogeneity by which it gains power. 62 There is much here which Bataille drew from his intellectual context: specifically, he is adapting from Kojève the notion of homogeneity. 63 For Kojève 'something is homogenous when the differences between its parts are not such as to form self-sufficient totalities of their own'. 64 Eventually for his interpretation of Hegel, the process of history leads to a 'universal homogeneous state, in which all citizens are satisfied, [and which] is also the world that no one can manage to overcome'. 65 This is Kojève's famous 'end of history'. 66 Bataille's response to this totality is broadly Nietzschean. 67 He affirms heterogeneity against totalising homogeneity; Bataille's 'heterology would be the theory of that which theory expels'. 68 Heterology theorises the process of exclusion without reducing it to the included: laughing, vomiting, shitting, and so on. 69 And dying which is for Bataille 'the main limit to homogenous existence'. 70 To say that taboo or sacred objects are 'untouchable and unspeakable' is also to say that they are unthinkable. 71 Bataille's heterology operates against philosophy (the Kojèvian/Hegelian 'system') avoiding subsuming the objects of his study to rationality. 72 Sovereignty then has a fundamentally paradoxical or 'prediscursive' nature. 73 The sovereign too represents the irrational that constrains, and thereby creates, the rational. 74 Or in ontological terms: for Hegel indeterminate 'being', being which is undetermined by any structure so as to make it a particular or a class, is meaningful only in opposition to 'nothing'. That is, 'being' is grasped only in terms of its negation. So, while on the one hand 'being' and 'nothing' seem distinct and opposed, on the other they appear the same; no criterion can differentiate them. 75 This idea is fundamental for Bataille though he is far too original a thinker to mechanically adopt it without making it his own. So while for Hegel being remains irreducible to if indistinguishable from nothingness, for Bataille it does not. Absolute Being is nothingness: 'being is nowhere'; 76 'absolute knowledge is definitive non-knowledge'; 77 'Life will dissolve itself [va se perdre] in death, rivers in the sea, and the known in the unknown. Knowledge is access to the unknown. Nonsense is the outcome of every possible sense'. 78 Sovereignty then ought to be understood as one of a cluster of concepts which all operate in fundamentally the same way and which are all, at least ontologically, largely interchangeable. The summit, often the summit of a pyramid which represents the constitution of society or of individual beings, is a visual/spatial metaphor; 79 sovereignty is the overtly political or anthropological metaphor; 80 God, the religious metaphor; knowledge, the epistemological metaphor. These all represent absolute Being; but of course Being is nothing or nowhere for Bataille: they are all paradoxical concepts. 81 To ask then after Bataille's ontology, specifically his ontology of the subject, is to invite a terse response: there is no subject in Bataille; or in any event his concept of the subject leans in the direction of being oxymoronic. A subject is a singular person or thing; 'heterogeneous subjectivity' is a contradiction in terms. 'MAN IS A PARTICLE INSERTED IN UNSTABLE AND TANGLED GROUPS […] Being is always a group of particles whose relative autonomies are maintained'. 82 Complex beingshuman beings, machines, bee hives, etc.lack autonomy, but desire it. 83 What there is for Bataille is the desire for autonomy and for being, a desire Bataille associates with 'the sickness of being'. 84 This is Bataille's fundamental vitalism, his adaption of Nietzsche's will to power. This is characterized by Bataille as the desire for sovereignty or mastery and as an ascent to the summit. 85 That is, for Bataille the movements of inclusion and exclusion need to be understood identically for all complex beings: in individual terms the subject is sovereign insofar as it is heterogeneous; it is homogenous insofar as it is unified. 86 The exclusion of heterogeneous elements from the homogeneous realm of consciousness formally recalls the exclusion of the elements, described (by psychoanalysis) as unconscious, which censorship excludes from the conscious ego [moi conscient]. 87 Taboo and repression are mechanisms of the exclusion of the heterogeneous from the homogeneous realm of consciousness. 88 And eroticism, par excellence, is a matter of taboo and transgression; much of Bataille's studies of eroticism consist of a study of 'the complementary relationship uniting taboos which reject violence, with acts of transgression which set it free. These counterbalanced urges have a kind of unity'; 89 'transgression does not deny the taboo but transcends it and completes it'. 90 In a static ontologyan ontology which describes what things themselves are -Bataille's terms are hard to keep hold of; they are much easier to grasp when they are understood in terms of actions, becoming, or processes: that is, in terms of change, particularly of the processes of desire and dissolution. This process then is Bataille's theory of sovereignty; ontologically, sovereignty remains both all and nothing. 91 There are two important but somewhat parenthetical points I would like to make before turning to Beauvoir's response to Bataille. First, process too is a feature of Beauvoir's ontology which is heavily inflected by the process of becoming a sovereign subject or of renouncing the project of attaining being. This constitutes one of the major differences between her and the broader phenomenological tradition. Second, both Beauvoir and Bataille are significant exegetes of Sade: Beauvoir in her famous 1951/2 essay; 92 Bataille from the 1930s and particularly in his 1957 writings. 93 For both interpretations the notion of sovereignty is significant: they both locate in Sade and his oeuvre the idea of the unique sovereign subject and its critique.
The term 'sovereignty' is then common to both Bataille and Beauvoir though of course in detail their use of it and the ontologies which underpin it are far from identical. The relationship here is complex but I think there is sufficient textual evidence to allow us to read Beauvoir as responding to Bataille (and through him to Kojève/Hegel) particularly in terms of the paradox of Bataille's subject. Bataille's subject lacks autonomy and so is a complex, is groundless and so lacks being; presupposing this, Beauvoir's subject wills itself into being and into ethical life.
Beauvoir's first nominal reference to Bataille (in fact to Bataille/Hegel) is in the context of endorsing his notion of the desire for being.
In the preface to The Inner Experience Georges Bataille emphasizes very forcefully that each individual wants to be All [Tout] . He sees in every other man and particularly in those whose existence is asserted with the most brilliance, a limit, a condemnation of himself. 'Each consciousness', said Hegel, 'seeks the death of the other'. And indeed at every moment others [autrui] are stealing the whole world away from me. The first movement is to hate them. But this hatred is naive, and the desire [l'envie] immediately struggles against itself. If I were really everything there would be nothing besides me; the world would be empty. There would be nothing to possess, and I would be nothing. 94 While this is in several sentences a narrow reference to Hegel's master-slave dialectic, it is so within a broader reference to Bataille's ontological problematic. Bataille analyses the desire of all beings for Being, not just the desire of one transcendent consciousness for recognition by another; for Bataille the question of sovereignty is posed in terms of heterogeneity and homogeneity, not just in terms of conflict with another consciousness. 95 For her part, Beauvoir's understanding of the subject is founded on concepts which parallel those of Bataille. This is especially the case for the individual's relationship to society and of being's relationship to nothingness. Here Beauvoir poses the Bataille/Hegel dilemma as a background to her express solution:
If the individual is nothing, society can not be something. Take his substance away from him, and the State has no more substance; if he has nothing to sacrifice, there is nothing before him to sacrifice to. Hegelian fullness immediately passes into the nothingness [néant] of absence. And the very grandeur of that failure makes his truth shine forth: only the subject can justify his own existence; no external subject [sujet étranger], no object can bring him salvation from the outside. 96 The ethical component of Beauvoir's work, her production of a substantive grounded subject from within this ontology of complex beings, is made up of two complementary moments. Firstly, she calls on the subject to will itself as ambiguous and to choose itself as free, to ground itself in an act of willing. This involves a renunciation of the desire to attain being. 97 To attain his truth, man must not attempt to dispel the ambiguity of his being but, on the contrary, accept the task of realizing it. He rejoins himself only to the extent that he agrees to remain at a distance from himself. 98 Secondly, and simultaneously, the subject must will the freedom of others: 'man can find a justification of his own existence only in the existence of other men'; 99 'to will oneself free is also to will others free'; 100 'to will man free is to will there to be being; it is to will the disclosure of being in the joy of existence'. 101 THE SECOND SEX: WOMAN AS HETEROGENEOUS OTHER I want to now turn to The Second Sex (1949) and show the implications of Beauvoir's use of Bataille in her chef d'oeuvre, to show the importance for Beauvoir scholarship of reading her with Bataille, and to foreground aspects of the text which have not yet received much critical attention. One of the ways Beauvoir understands woman to be other is in terms of her having heterogeneous being vis-à-vis men's unified being.
Beauvoir's appropriation of Bataille's ontology is in the first instance evident in her version of the emergence of civil society from the 'primitive hordes'. 102
Many tribes live under a communal regime […] but men and woman only have a religious, social, and economic existence as a group: their individuality remains a purely biological fact; […] The clan as a whole, gathered under the same totem, mystically shares the same mana [mana] and materially shares the common enjoyment of a territory […] the clan grasps itself in this territory in the guise of an objective and concrete figure; through the permanence of the land, the clan thus realizes itself as a unity whose identity persists throughout the passage of time. 103 Recall that for Bataille the individual gains access to the universal through social groups, and through a sovereign or a god which amalgamates the disparate elements of the group and 96 Beauvoir, Ethics of Ambiguity, 106; Beauvoir, 'Pour une morale de l'ambiguïté', 131-2. See also, Beauvoir, Second Sex, 160. 97 Beauvoir, Ethics of Ambiguity, 13: 'Man's being is a lack of being but this lack has a way of being which is precisely existence'. 98 Beauvoir, Ethics of Ambiguity, 13. Beauvoir, 'Pour une morale de l'ambiguïté', 19. 99 thereby gains its power. 104 And so for Beauvoir the tribe is unitedit 'encounters its own alienated existence'by its totem and its territory. The subject's individualism remains for her purely biological.
[The subject] felt lost in nature and in the group, passive, threatened, the plaything of obscure forces; it was only in identifying the whole clan that he dared to think of himself: the totem, the mana, and the earth were collective realities. 105 Significantly, this is the condition in which woman will remain. Not so for man who with the 'discovery of bronze' begins to 'grasp himself as autonomous activity and to accomplish himself in his singularity [singularité]'. 106 'When the individual separates from the community, he demands a singular embodiment [incarnation singulière]: the mana is individualized in the chief, then in the individual'. 107 The parallel with Bataille's ontology is stark. The subject is neither heterogeneous nor homogeneous per se, but is so only relative to others: a unified subject may also provide the unifying power of a group and so be external to it (i.e., heterogeneous). And so Beauvoir understands the sovereign to be one who imposes unity or wholeness (and so is itself heterogeneous) while also understanding the sovereign as itself unified or singular (homogeneous). Note, however, that while for Bataille the abject is heterogeneous and also sovereign, for Beauvoir abjection (and immanence) remains associated with heterogeneity but is not linked to sovereignty, singularity, or masculinity. 108 For Beauvoir individual unity is linked to the emergence of private property. Reading Beauvoir with Bataille, we see that it is through the advent of private property that individual men attain the sovereignty previously held only by the totem or chief. It is in unifying property (the owner imposes unity on otherwise diverse things) that man becomes sovereign. Owning nothing, woman does not attain individuality or singularity but contributes rather to the sovereignty of her father or husband. 109 Once woman is dethroned by the advent of private property, her fate is linked to it for centuries […] The fundamental importance of this institution becomes clear if we keep in mind that the owner alienated his existence in property; it was more important to him than [il y tient plusqu'à] life itself; it goes beyond the strict limits of a mortal lifetime, it lives on after the body is gone, an earthly and tangible incarnation of the immortal soul. 110 Woman's being remains heterogeneous. This helps makes sense of Beauvoir's reference to man as woman's god. 111 In this history, it originally was the god or totem (the religious sovereign) which unified the group. This function was gradually transferred to the chief (the political sovereign) and then to man (the individual sovereign). This makes sense too of Beauvoir's claim that the condition of woman serves man's ontological ambitions: 112 it is by enforcing unity upon his domainand so upon womanthat the male becomes sovereign.
Woman remains lost in nature and the group. Because of this 'it is in woman that the whole of foreign Nature is concentrated'; 113 woman becomes 'the perfect intermediary between nature that is foreign to man and the peer who is identical to him'. 114 It is this understanding of the differing being of man and woman that informs the first chapter of 'Myths', a section described by Bauer as 'long and exceptionally elliptical and dense [but] pivotal to understanding Beauvoir's appropriation of the master-slave dialectic'. 115 I want to add the presence of Bataille/Hegel to readings which till now have been dominated by Kojève/Hegel.
Bataille does not privilege consciousness: his analysis of beings is apropos of all complex beings: bee-hives, the state/leviathan, the human being, and so on. For Bataille the desire for Being, the desire to be All, is common to all beings because lack is common to all. This lack gives Beauvoir a sense of 'otherness' which is not anthropological but which is represented in woman; that is, there are ways of understanding Beauvoir's use of 'otherness' which are not understood in terms of the slave's transcendent but dependent consciousness (i.e., the masterslave dichotomy). Nor are they other-as-object (i.e., the subject-object dichotomy). They are not-this in a holist or organicist sense, in an absolute sense (i.e., the particular-universal dichotomy): Beauvoir equates this sense of other with nature understood in the terms of a Hegelian Nature/Spirit binary; 116 it is also associated with 'the All'. 117 Man is in constant struggle against this other:
Man's life is never plenitude and rest, it is lack and movement, it is combat. Facing himself, man encounters Nature; he has hold of it, he tries to appropriate it for himself. But it cannot satisfy him. Either it realizes itself as a purely abstract opposition […] or else it passively submits to man's desire and allows itself to be assimilated by him […] he possesses it only in consuming it, that is, in destroying it. In both cases, he remains alone. 118 As Bauer points out 'the idea of ceaseless struggle is not a part of [Hegel's] Phenomenology': 119 in terms of the master-slave dialectic struggle is only present in the fight to death and is not ongoing. But constant struggle is a feature of Bataille's ontology and Nature understood as the totality of Beingthe Allis the adversary (not another consciousness). Beauvoir's use of Bataille is similar to her use of Kojève/Hegel insofar as she uses Bataille to analyze the relationship between man and woman: by evoking the traditional/mythical equation of woman with Nature, Beauvoir shows that woman becomes the representation of the All against which man is ceaselessly and hopelessly pitted: '[Man] would like himself to be as necessary as pure Idea, as One, All, absolute Spirit'; 120 '[Woman] is man's prey; she is his downfall, she is everything he is not and wants to have, his negation and his raison d'être'. 121 In one sense this makes woman everything, but again Beauvoir uses Bataille's idea that to be everything is to be nothing: woman becomes absolute Other. She is All and Nothing.
[Woman is] mother Earth as a face of darkness: she is chaos where everything comes from and must return one day; she is Nothingness [Néant] […] Man wants to assert his individual existence and proudly rest on his 'essential difference', but he also wants to break the barriers of the self and commingle with water, earth, night, Nothingness [Néant] , with the Whole [Tout]. Woman who condemns man to finitude also enables him to surpass his own limits: and that is where the equivocal magic surrounding her comes from. 122 This mythological equation of woman with Nature allows particular women to fulfill the role of mediator to Nature. 123 For Bataille, only when seducedspecifically he means a virile man responding to desirable female nudity -'can [the individual] find the plenitude of a total existence'. 124 And so for Beauvoir, beyond her being other-as-object, this is the significance of woman's being possessed in the 'flesh'. 125 In her flesh woman instantiates Nature and is the site of man's futile struggle with that All.
Beauvoir is a philosophical eclectic and this understanding of woman as Other works in parallel with an understanding in terms of consciousness: 'man seeks the Other in woman as in Nature and as his peer'. 126 This is the source of woman's very particular ambiguity: 'through the Other I accede to the Whole, but it separates me from the Whole; it is the door to infinity and the measure of my finitude. And this is why woman embodies no set concept […] However she is considered, it is this ambivalence that is most striking'. 127 The close of the chapter is worth quoting at length:
Here, then, is why woman has a double and deceptive image [décevant visage]: she is everything he craves and everything he does not attain. She is the wise mediator between auspicious Nature and man; and she is the temptation of nature, untamed against all reason. She is the carnal embodiment of all moral values and their opposite, from good to bad; she is the stuff of action and its obstacle, man's grasp on the world and his failure; as such she is the source of all man's reflection on his existence and all expression he gave of it; however she works to divert him from himself, to make him sink into silence and death. As his servant and companion, man expects her also to be his public and his judge, to confirm him in his being; but she opposes him with her indifference, even with her mockery and her laughter [mais elle le conteste par son indifférence, voire ses moqueries et ses rires]. He projects on to her what he desires and fears, what he loves and what he hates. And if it is difficult to say anything about her, it is because man seeks himself entirely in her and because she is All [Tout]. But she is All in that which is inessential: she is wholly the Other [Autre]. And as other she is other than herself, other than what is expected of her. Being all, she is never exactly this that she should be; she is everlasting disappointment [déception], the very disappointment [déception] of existence that never successfully attains or reconciles itself with the totality of existents. 128 beings: there are far too many tensions between Bataille's ontology and the broader phenomenological tradition in which Beauvoir is so deeply engaged for this not to be the case. 129 Rather I am arguing that Beauvoir is using or appropriating Bataille's heterology just as it has been shown she is using Kojève's master-slave dialectic; she is adopting concepts she finds useful in serving her analysis of the place of women in contemporary society. Recall his description of woman as taboo which for Bataille is both a source of both attraction and repulsion. 130 Doubtless, the sexual parts are not truly repugnant unless they belong to a person devoid of charma fat old woman, for example. But the most desirable woman's organs partake in the unspeakable nature of the organs of the woman who is old and obese. Thus they partake in the nature of the sacred nucleus; which is even less surprising, because, as I have mentioned, this nucleus refers to, among other taboo horrors, menstrual blood. 131 Beauvoir, in what is another example of what Michèle Le Doeuff has described vis-à-vis Sartre as her 'operative philosophy', appropriates Bataille's egregiously misogynistic thought and develops it into her own. 132 Without reading her as failing to differentiate human beings from any composite being, if we allow her to share with Bataille the idea that human beings are never singular but are only more-or-less autonomous (her subject is essentially ambiguous after all), we may also allow her the idea that woman's being is simply more heterogeneous than man's. This interpretation is supported by Beauvoir's descriptions of embodied sexual difference and women's lived experience. In a use of the notions of alienation and the unified male subject which parallel the historical and mythological sections of The Second Sex, Beauvoir argues that in childhood it is alienation to the unified object of the penishere playing a role analogous to the totemwhich allows a young boy to bodily assume his subjectivity, 'the very object in which he alienates himself becomes a symbol of autonomy, transcendence, and power'. 133 By comparison the young girl is anatomically opaque to herself and so 'cannot incarnate herself in any part of her own body'. 134 This provides the link between Beauvoir's ontological understandings of the condition of woman and her biological understanding of the woman's body. 'A woman's bodyand specifically the girl'sis a "hysterical" body in the sense that there is, so to speak, no distance between psychic life and its physiological realization'. 135 This is part of the significance for Beauvoir of woman's experience of a disunified and porous body particularly as it is experienced in pregnancy and in menstruation. And famously Beauvoir makes much out of the fact that the woman is penetrated in heterosexual sex: in the sexual act, 'the man's body remains intact […] the woman is penetrated and impregnated, and this always constitutes a kind of rape'. 136 Man's sex organ is neat and simple, like a finger; it can be innocently exhibited, and boys often show it off to their friends proudly and defiantly; the feminine sex organ is mysterious to the woman herself, hidden, tormented, mucous, and humid; it bleeds each month, it is sometimes soiled with bodily fluids [d'humeurs], it has a secret and dangerous life. 137 After the sexual act, a woman struggles with the demands of her body 'cleaning herself as a dirty vase, while man reclines in bed in his superb wholeness [superbe intégrité]'. 138 These descriptions of the female body are problematical and have been much criticized. 139 But this ontology allows Beauvoir to write in positive terms of a woman's desire for erotic union with her lover, a desire which is not a feature of male sexuality at least insofar as it is characterized by integrity and unity. 140 And these descriptions need to be read too in light of Beauvoir's celebration of ontological ambiguity which she made explicit in the Ethics. Here too there is thematic continuity with Bataille for whom 'two beings of the opposite sex are lost in one another and together form a new being different from either […] . Love expresses a need for sacrifice: Each unity must lose itself in some other that exceeds it'. 141 Finally, the heterogeneous being of woman is for Beauvoir linked to her experience of sexual pleasure itself. This passage of The Second Sex is famous:
Male pleasure soars [Le plaisir male monte en flèche]; when it reaches a certain threshold it fulfils itself and dies abruptly in orgasm; the structure of the sexual act is finite and discontinuous. Feminine pleasure radiates through the whole body; it is not always centered in the genital system; vaginal contractions then even more than a true orgasm constitute a system of undulations that rhythmically arise, subside, re-form reach for some instants a paroxysm, then blur and dissolve without ever completely dying. Because no fixed goal is assigned to it [Du fait qu'aucun terme fixe ne lui estassigné], pleasure aims at infinity: nervous or cardiac fatigue or psychical satiety often limit the woman's erotic possibilities rather than precise satisfaction; even fully fulfilled, even exhausted, she is never totally relieved [délivrée]. 142 The translation of 'terme' as 'goal' here inclines this passage towards a reading in terms of intentionality and goal-oriented action. But the French need not have this meaning: a 'terme' is a limit or end in either a spatial or temporal (read: ontological) sense. Where male pleasure is finite, feminine sexual pleasure is unbounded and aims at the All. Recall that the erotic in Bataille is privileged because it is the experience of heterogeneity: in the erotic the subject breaks its boundaries and loses its coherence and this is why for Bataille eroticism is the assenting to life 'up to the point of death'. 143 Where recent scholarship has focused on Beauvoir's phenomenology of sexual difference in terms of a tradition of the phenomenology of the body which leads from Husserl to Merleau-Ponty, I would like to suggest in closing that there are resources here for adding to this an understanding of sexual difference in terms of heterological being. 144 Notwithstanding much work, it has recently been argued that Beauvoir scholarship is at an impasse that, still bound by some of her own comments, scholars continue to read Beauvoir in Sartre's shadow. 145 I have in this paper added Bataille to the list of Beauvoir's significant interlocutors, a move which produces useful effects for the understanding of Beauvoir's oeuvre. In doing so I do not seek to diminish her independence as a philosopher, rather I have attempted to 'read Beauvoir such as she is'. 146 Beauvoir is a synthetic philosopher, an eclectic in the proper sense of the term; she draws on a wide philosophical erudition appropriating others' thought but always to serve her own original purpose. I have shown that Beauvoir's relationship to Hegel is more complex and sophisticated than most commentators have so far suggested, largely because it is not sufficient to read her Hegelianism only in terms of Kojève's master-slave dialectic. Exegesis is not complete, but I have shown that we ought to take Beauvoir's appropriation of Bataille seriously if we are to understand her response to Hegel.
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